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The Impact of Howard Johnson on the Labor Obligations 9£ 
the Successor Employer 
The extent to which a successor to the ownership of a business 
must assume the labor obligations of the preceding owner is a much-
clouded issue of federal labor law. In a series of decisions beginning 
in 1964, the Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the conflicting 
interests of employers and employees in the successorship context. It 
has reached seemingly inconsistent conclusions, however, and thus 
has left business planners and unions without clear guidelines to 
facilitate smooth transitions in ownership. In its most recent deci-
sion, Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board,1 
the Court held that a bona fide purchaser of the assets of a business 
that continues to operate the business but hires only a handful of its 
predecessor's employees is under no obligation to honor an arbitration 
clause in its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. 
This Note assesses the impact of Howard Johnson on the labor-
law obligations of successor employers. Part I analyzes the prior case 
law; part II critiques the reasoning of the Howard Johnson opinion; 
part III considers the merits of a new approach to the successorship 
problem, suggested in a footnote in Howard Johnson. 
I. PRIOR CASE LAW 
The import of Howard Johnson can best be assessed by examin-
ing the Court's earlier decisions in the successorship field. At issue 
in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,2 the first of these decisions, were 
the obligations of Wiley, the surviving corporation of a merger, under 
a collective-bargaining agreement signed by Interscience, the corpora-
tion that had disappeared in the merger. The Interscience bargaining 
agreement contained an arbitration clause but no provision purport-
ing to make the agreement binding on any successor to Interscience. 
After the merger, Wiley employed virtually all of the Interscience 
employees; first, at the Interscience plant, which Wiley continued to 
operate for a time substantially as before the merger, and, subse-
quently, at the much larger nonunion Wiley plant.3 The labor union 
1. 417 U.S. 249 (1974), noted in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAR.v. L. 
R.Ev. 43, 265 (1974). 
2. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
3. In Wiley, the Supreme Court found "the wholesale transfer of Interscience em-
ployees to the Wiley plant" to be significant, but omitted the fact that this transfer 
occurred some time after the date of the merger. 376 U.S. at 551. The latter fact 
was noted in the Howard Johnson opinion. 417 U.S. at 258 n.4, citing Interscience 
Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 210, 218-20 (1970). The Court's failure to make 
the facts upon which it relied entirely explicit has complicated interpretation of its 
holdings in these cases. Cf. Feller, Status of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
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representing the Interscience employees sued under section 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act4 to compel Wiley to arbitrate 
various claims pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Interscience 
bargaining agreement. 
The Supreme Court, holding for the union, stated that "the 
disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered 
into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automat-
ically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement, 
and that, in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor 
employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the 
agreement."11 In finding that, despite traditional contract principles, a 
nonconsenting nonsignatory to a collective bargaining agreement 
could be bound by at least some of its terms, 6 the Court relied heavily 
on the national labor policy in favor of settling disputes through 
arbitration7 and on the proposition that a collective bargaining agree-
ment is not an ordinary contract, but rather a formulation of the 
"common law'' of the shop.8 National labor policy, the Court asserted, 
required "1hat the rightful prerogative of owners independently to 
rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers 
be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden 
Under Wiley v. Livingston: A Union Counsel's View, 18 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAnon 
277,281 (1966). 
4. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1970). 
5. 376 U.S. at 548. The Court first decided that the question whether or not 
the company had to arbitrate was one for the courts rather than the arbitrator to 
decide. 376 U.S. at 546-47. It further held that questions of "procedural arbitrabil-
ity" should be left to the arbitrator. 376 U.S. at 555-59. While these holdings were 
significant aspects of Wiley, they do not bear on the successor employer issues with 
which this Note is concerned and thus will not be dealt with herein. For discussion 
of these issues, see Note, Procedural Arbitrability Under Section 301 of the LMRA, 
73 YALE LJ. 1459 (1964); The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HAR.v. L. RBv. 143, 
285 (1964). 
6. Although the Court did note that the surviving corporation in a merger is or-
dinarily liable for the debts and contracts of the disappearing corporation, 376 U.S. 
at 550 n.3, its decision did not rest on this ground but rather on "[f]ederal law, fa. 
shioned 'from the policy of our national labor laws.'" 376 U.S. at 548. Nor was 
Wiley's obligation based on any sort of privity with Interscience in an ordinary con-
tract sense. The potentially profound impact of this view of the collective bargaining 
agreement on labor law developments was quickly noted. See, e.g., Feller, supra note 
3, at 277-79; Platt, The NLRB and the Arbitrator in Sale and Merger Situations, 
19 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 375, 375-78 (1967). 
7. 376 U.S. at 549-50. The Court had previously emphasized this policy in the 
"Steelworkers Trilogy," Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 
(1960), Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), 
and Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). One 
commentator found that "[t]he overriding importance of Wiley is that it expresses 
an unmistakable preference for private arbitration as the forum to resolve representa-
tion and contract problems involving ownership changes." Lippman, Changes of 
Ownership and Representation Problems: A Union View, 18 N.Y.U. CoNF. ON 
LABOR 135, 324 (1966). 
8. 376 U.S. at 550. 
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change in the employment relationship."9 Since employees and their 
union were likely to be excluded from negotiations leading to a 
change in corporate ownership, which could greatly affect their inter-
ests, the enforcement of an arbitration clause would ease the transi-
tion and reduce industrial strife.10 
Wiley left unclear the circumstances under which it was appropri-
ate to impose a duty to arbitrate. One interpretation was that Wiley 
applied only to merger cases, where state law required the surviving 
corporation to assume the liabilities and obligations of the merged 
corporation.11 Most authorities12 concluded, however, that Wiley 
applied in the purchase-of-assets context as well, largely because of 
the Wiley Court's statement that 
[i]t would derogate from "the federal policy of settling labor dis-
putes by arbitration" . . . if a change dn the corporate structure or 
ownership of a business enterprise had the automatic consequence 
of removing a duty to arbitrate previously established; this is so as 
much in cases like the present, where the contracting employer dis-
appears into another by merger, as in those in which one owner 
replaces another but the business entity remains the same.13 
The Wiley Court did suggest that it would be inappropriate to 
impose a duty to arbitrate on a new employer in the absence of "any 
substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise before and 
after a change [of ownership or corporate structure]."14 The NLRB 
had previously used a similar "continuity of the business enterprise 
test'' in determining the propriety of imposing on -a successor em-
ployer a duty to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union.15 
Drawing upon the NLRB's experience in these representation cases, 16 
courts applying Wiley looked to three interrelated factors in determin- _ 
ing whether the identity of an enterprise had been continued: the 
9. 376 U.S. at 549. 
10. 376 U.S. at 549. This view of the balance between employer rights and em-
ployee rights met a mixed reception from the commentators. Compare Lippman, 
supra note 7, at 316, with Shaw & Carter, Sales, Mergers and Union Contract Rela-
tions, 19 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 357, 374 (1967) (Court's approach too burden-
some to employer and potentially dangerous to employees whose jobs may depend 
on new employer's willingness to take on business). 
11. See, e.g., Shaw & Carter, supra note 10, at 366-69. 
12. See, e.g., McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 
335 .J:<'.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 
F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964); Barbash, Status of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Under Wiley v. Livingston: A Management Counsel's View, 18 N.Y.U. CoNF. ON 
LABOR 259, 269 (1966); Feller, supra note 3, at 282. Cf. Golden State Bottling Co. 
v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182n.5 (1973). But see Shaw & Carter, supra note 10. 
13. 376 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added). 
14. 376 U.S. at 551. 
15. See Stonewall Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 325, 327 (1948) (whether any "es-
sential attribute of the employment relationship has been changed as a result of the 
transfer''). 
16. NLRB cases are collected in Feller, supra note 3, at 287 n.18. 
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degree of continuity in the work force, the similarity of operation 
before and after the ownership change, and the degree to which assets 
were transferred. 
Continuity in the work force was for most courts the most impor-
tant single factor in deciding whether to impose a duty to arbitrate on 
the successor employer, 17 although no court considered whether such 
continuity alone would be determinative.18 In considering the simi-
larity of operation, courts looked to whether the same jobs were being 
performed in the same way as before, whether the size and structure 
of the successor company was significantly different from that of the 
predecessor,19 and, to a lesser degree, whether the enterprise's prod-
ucts, services, and supervisory personnel remained the same, whether 
the operation was carried on in the same location, and whether there 
was any hiatus in operations in the transition. 20 As to the transfer of 
assets, courts looked to the carry-over of physical assets, like plant 
and equipment, the carry-over of intangibles, like trademarks, cus-
tomer lists, and goodwill, and, to some extent, the assumption of a 
predecessor's liabilities and obligations.21 These factors seemed to in-
dicate whether the business had been significantly changed from the 
employee's point of view, whether the transfer preserved the appear-
ance of a continuing enterprise in the eyes of third parties, and 
whether there existed a nexus between the successive employers 
upon which to base the transfer of labor obligations. 22 
17. Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 735, 793-95 (1969). See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 
335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 
F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964). A notable exception is Monroe Sandet Corp. v. Livings-
ton, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967), in which arbitration 
was ordered although no employees covered by the bargaining agreement were re-
tained when the parent corporation shut down the subsidiary at which they worked 
and shifted operations in the area to a different, newly acquired subsidiary. 
18. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 751 (stating that courts had not let successor-
ship be defeated by the employer's failure to retain employees when there had been 
a substantial transfer of assets and the operation of the business remained much the 
same). 
19. See Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship-
A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1056-57 (1973). 
20. See id. at 1056-63 (concluding that these factors have not been consistently 
applied). 
21. See Goldberg, supra note 17, at 804. 
22. The degree to which the employees' point of view should be controlling is 
a matter of some dispute. Compare Goldberg, supra note 17, at 754, with Local 954, 
Retail Store Employees v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655, 658-59 (N.D. 
Ohio 1966), and St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Deci-
sions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 269, 275 (1973). St. Antoine ar-
gues that there must be some "nexus" at the employer "end of the relationship" more 
significant than "the bare movement of employees from one employer to another," 
id., while Goldberg suggests that the continuity of work force may be enough of a 
transfer of "assets" to justify imposing a duty to bargain on the successor. Goldberg, 
supra, at 749-50. 
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Courts applying Wiley also derived from that case a second 
limiting factor on the imposition of a duty to arbitrate: the possibility 
of inter-union conflicts. In Wiley, the Court noted in passing that 
there was no problem of union conflicts since the Wiley employees 
were not organized.23 In applying Wiley, courts refused to order 
arbitration where, because of the presence of more than one union, 
the arbitration award would have been unenforceable or would sim-
ply have fostered industrial strife, or where the employer would have 
been put in the position of committing an unfair labor practice. 24 
Commentators concluded, however, that Wiley did not mandate a 
denial of arbitration when two unions were involved; one suggested 
that Wiley supported three-party arbitration;25 another, that arbitra-
tors could simply weigh the possible unrest that their granting of 
particular claims would cause and shape their awards accordingly. 26 
In addition to leaving unclear the circumstances under which it 
would be appropriate to require a successor employer to arbitrate, 
Wiley provided little guidance on the proper standards for arbitrators 
to use and on possible substantive limits on arbitration awards. It 
seemed clear, on the one hand, that the imposition of a duty to 
arbitrate was meaningless unless an arbitrator could require compli-
ance with substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
and, on the other hand, that the arbitrator was required to consider 
the factors unique to the successorship context. Most courts and 
commentators therefore viewed Wiley as giving new freedom and 
responsibility to the arbitrator:27 Whereas an arbitrator's duty in a 
labor dispute ordinarily was to interpret and apply the terms of the 
contract, in the successorship context it was left to the arbitrator to 
decide the extent to which each of the collective bargaining agree-
ment's terms was to remain in force. 28 
23. 376 U.S. at 551-52 n.5. 
24. See, e.g., Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 
374 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967); McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d 
3S2 (2d Cir. 1966). McGuire wins approval in Shaw & Carter, supra note 10, at 
372. The general emphasis on a retained majority of employees is, in part, a safe-
guard against the acute danger to an employer of committing an unfair labor practice 
by bargaining with a minority union. 
25. Barbash, supra note 12, at 271. Cf. Lippman, supra note 7, at 324. 
26. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 760. 
27. "The requirements of the contract remain basic guides to the law of the shop, 
but the arbitrator may find that equities inherent in changed circumstances require 
an award in a particular controversy at variance with some term or terms of that 
contract." United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d 
Cir. 1964). Accord, Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 
9S4, 958 (9th Cir. 1964). The underlying assumption of these cases seems to have 
been that, without this permission to adapt the relief given to the circumstances of 
the case, the arbitrator would be required to enforce the collective bargaining con-
tract in all its terms. 
28. See Note, The Successor Employer's Duty To Arbitrate: A Reconsideration 
of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 84 HARv. L. REv. 418, 426 (1968). The 
560 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 14:SSS 
A final issue raised by the Wiley decision was whether substantive 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement could be imposed on a 
successor employer by courts or the NLRB rather than by an arbitra-
tor. Although the Court stated its holding in Wiley strictly in terms 
of an obligation to arbitrate, the language of the opinion suggested 
that other terms of a collective bargaining agreement might also sur-
vive and bind a successor employer. 29 Thus, while the extent of a 
successor employer's obligations would typically be raised in actions 
to compel arbitration because of the prevalence of arbitration clauses 
in collective bargaining agreements, it seemed only reasonable that, 
in cases where there was no arbitration clause, a court could determine 
that the agreement or parts thereof survived a change of ownership. 30 
The next logical extension of Wiley was to view it as permitting 
enforcement of the surviving agreement by the NLRB.31 Under 
section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act32 (NLRA), an 
employer commits an unfair labor practice by refusing "to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees"; under section 
8(d),33 the duty to bargain collectively includes a duty to honor a 
collective bargaining agreement during its term. It seemed, there-
fore, that a refusal by a new employer to honor a collective bargaining 
freedom given the arbitrator in such cases was not universally welcomed, see, e.g., 
Shaw & Carter, supra note 10, at 270-72, but may not have been a great departure 
from the usual practices of arbitrators, see Goldberg, supra note 17, at 786 & n.169. 
Since very few ca5es of this sort have actually resulted in an arbitrator's award, id. 
at 746 n.45; Slicker, supra note 19, at 1085-86, conclusions as to the actual standards 
used are difficult to draw. Nevertheless, the guidelines provided by the courts in 
these cases are significant in determining the rights and obligations of a successor 
employer. 
29. See Feller, supra note 3, at 283. 
30. See id.; Goldberg, supra note 17, at 746. But cf. Barbash, supra note 12, 
at 267. 
In a rare section 301 case to present the issue, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, citing Wiley, held that the court could find a successor employer to be in 
breach of a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See Teamsters Local 249 
v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956 (1974). The court noted that "the policies 
of our national labor law weigh heavily in favor of a doctrine that preserves intact 
the employees' bargained-for rights and duties, or at least a portion of them." 493 
F.2d at 963 (emphasis added). There is a question still as to the courts' ability to 
enforce only selected parts of a collective bargaining agreement even if the successor 
should be found to be bound by the agreement. One of the claims made for arbitra-
tion, it may be recalled, is the arbitrator's unique flexibility and expertise in deciding 
which terms of the agreement should be enforced against a successor employer. In 
Bill's Trucking, successorship was based on a sale of stock; courts may be more hesi-
tant to undertake the difficult task of enforcing some terms of a contract in situations 
where successorship is not so solidly grounded. 
31. See Comment, The Impact of John Wiley Revisited-From the Vindication 
of Policy to the Verge of Iniquity, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875 (1970) (predicting and 
criticizing this result of the "cross-fertilization" of the courts and the NLRB). 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970). 
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). 
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agreement that survived a transfer of a business would be an unfrur 
labor practice actionable by the NLRB.34 
The prevailing view after Wiley of a successor employer's obliga-
tions under its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement was 
significantly altered by the Supreme Court's second successor-em-
ployer decision, NLRB v. Burns lnternatlonal Security Services, 
lnc.35 Through a competitive -bidding process, Burns Security ob-
tained a contract to provide protection services at a Lockheed Air-
craft plant. In assembling its work force of forty-two, Bums 
transferred fifteen guards from other Bums locations and hired 
twenty-seven guards formerly employed by Wackenhut, the previous 
contractor with Lockheed. Four months earlier, the Wackenhut em-
ployees had elected a union as their exclusive bargaining representa-
tive, and, two months thereafter, the union had signed a three-year 
collective bargaining agreement with Wackenhut. Upon Bums' re-
fusal to honor the agreement or even to recognize the union, unfrur 
labor practice proceedings were brought against it. The Board, using 
Wiley for the first time to impose contract obligations on a successor 
employer, held that, as a successor to Wackenhut, Bums was obli-
gated both to recognize and bargain with the union and to honor 
the terms of the existing collective bargaining contract. 36 Successor-
ship was based on the fact that a majority of Bums' guards were 
former Wackenhut employees and were performing for Bums essen-
tially the same jobs in the same locatiop. ·as they had for Wackenhut. 
On review, 37 the Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of a duty 
to recognize and bargain with the union; it stated that such a duty 
arises "where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority 
of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a 
recently certified bargaining agent." The -Court concluded, however, 
that the NLRB could not enforce the collective bargaining agreement 
because Bums had neither signed it nor consented to be bound by it. 
The Court distinguished Wiley on three grounds. 38 First, Wiley 
involved a merger and was therefore set against a background of state 
law requiring the surviving corporation to assume the obligations of 
the disappearing corporation. Second, in Wiley there had been close 
ties between the two employers, whereas between Wackenhut and 
Bums there had been no relationship whatsoever. Finally, Wiley was 
a section 301 suit to compel arbitration rather than an unfair labor 
34. See Feller, supra note·3, at 289. 
35. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
36. William J. Burns Intl. Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970). 
37. The court of appeals had refused to enforce the portion of the Board's order 
requiring Burns to honor the substantive terms of the contract, although it did order 
enforcement of the bargaining order. :William J. Burns Intl. Detective Agency, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971). 
38. See 406 U.S. at 285-86. 
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practice action in which, under section 8(d) of the NLRA,30 the 
NLRB's powers to impose terms on an unconsenting party are se-
verely limited. 
Section 8(d), as construed in H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,40 
prohibits the NLRB from requiring bargaining parties to make any 
concession or to agree on any terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Viewing this provision as embodying the fundamental premise 
of the federal labor law that the resolution of employer-union disputes 
is to occur through free collective bargaining or voluntary arbitration 
rather than through governmental imposition of compulsory terms, 
the Burns Court concluded that employers and unions "are free from 
having contract provisions imposed upon them against their will."41 It 
was this fundamental principle that the Board, in imposing the bar-
gaining agreement on Burns, had failed to heed. The imposition on 
Burns of a duty to bargain with the union, the Court stated, was not 
inconsistent with this conclusion; that duty arose not from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, which Burns had not consented to be 
bound by, but from the fact that Burns "voluntarily took over a 
bargaining unit that was largely intact and that had been certified 
within the past year."42 On a policy level, the Court noted that "[a] 
potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business 
only if he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of 
the labor force, work location, task assignment, and nature of super-
vision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and conditions of 
employment contained in the old collective-bargaining contract may 
make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the 
transfer of capital."43 
Burns raised a number of questions regarding its application in 
the duty-to-bargain context and its effect on Wiley.44 With regard to 
the duty to bargain, the Court assumed that the collective bargaining 
unit remained appropriate in Burns, and therefore it provided little 
guidance as to what factors are relevant in determining the appropri-
ateness of a unit after a change of ownership. By stressing that the 
majority of Burns' new work force had been employed by Burns' 
organized predecessor, 45 the Court seemed to follow the established 
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). 
40. 397 U.S. 99 (1970). 
41. 406 U.S. at 287. 
42. 406 U.S. at 287. 
43. 406 U.S. at 287-88. 
44. For a fuller discussion of these questions and of developments in the duty 
to bargain area, see Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975). 
45. The "majority" of which the Court spoke was of the employees hired by the 
new employer, not a majority of the old work force. While this has been generally 
understood, the latter interpretation has been championed. See Zim's Foodliner, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1139-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). 
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proposition that, if less than a majority of his new work force is from 
the old, an employer need not bargain with the old employees' union 
since that union could not be presumed to represent a majority of his 
employees. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting on the issue of Burns' duty 
to bargain, persuasively argued that the fact of a large-scale transfer 
of employees should not be conclusive of the duty to bargain since a 
variety of differences between the old and new enterprises could 
render the old bargaining unit inappropriate. 46 Commentators47 
seemed to agree with this logic, and the prevailing view after Burns 
seemed to be that, despite its emphasis on the identity of the work 
force, Burns did not render irrelevant the other factors considered in 
determining successorship in earlier section 301 suits and NLRB 
representation cases. 48 
Burns was also unclear as to the point at which the duty to 
bargain arises when the bargaining unit remains appropriate. In 
Burns, the duty apparently did not arise until Burns' hiring was 
completed because the majority status of former Wackenhut employ-
ees was not clearly established until that time. 49 The Court's opinion 
implied, however, that the duty might arise sooner under different 
circumstances: "[T]here will be instances in which it is perfectly 
clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the 
unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him initially consult 
with the employees' bargaining representative before he fixes 
terms."50 Because the Court failed to expand on this point, courts 
and commentators had difficulty applying it to specific successorship 
situations. 51 
46. Joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Powell, Justice Rehn-
quist first noted that the number of Wackenhut employees hired by Bums did not 
mathematically ensure that a majority of the Bums employees had supported the 
union. That determination, he said, had not been made independently, but had been 
based on the theory that Bums was a successor, and therefore bound. The imposition 
of the duty to bargain was justified then only if the successorship doctrine was prop-
erly applied to this case, which, Rehnquist said, it was not: The interests of in-
dustrial stability and employee protection must be balanced with those of employer 
freedom, and freedom of employees in choosing bargaining representatives. The ob-
ligations of successorship may properly be imposed on the employer who enjoys the 
benefit of tangible or intangible assets of a predecessor, but should not attach when 
"the only connection between the two employing entities is a naked transfer of em-
ployees." 406 U.S. at 307. "Phrased another way," Rehnquist stated, "the doctrine 
of successorship in the federal common law of labor relations accords to employees 
the same general protection against transfer of assets by an entity against which they 
have a claim as is accorded by other legal doctrines to nonlabor-related claimants 
against the same entity." 406 U.S. at 305. 
47. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 275; Note, supra note 44, at 765-71. 
48. See text at notes 15-22 supra. 
49. 406 U.S. at 295. 
50. 406 U.S. at 294-95. 
51. See Spitzer Akron, Inc. v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1972), vacated 
and remanded, 411 U.S. 979 (1973); NLRB v. Denham, 469 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 
1972), vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 945 (1973); NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet 
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The effect of Burns on Wiley quickly became a subject of much 
debate.52 A necessary corollary to Wiley's holding that a successor 
employer could be required to arbitrate under his predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining agreement was that some if not all of the substantive 
terms of such an agreement could survive a change in ownership.113 
Yet Burns strongly implied that the NLRB could not compel a new 
employer to honor any substantive terms of his predecessor's contract, 
and it arguably imposed similar restrictions on the powers of the 
federal courts. 
Some writers, seizing on the Court's suggested distinction between 
Wiley as a section 301 suit to compel arbitration and Burns as an 
unfair labor practice case before the NLRB, strongly urged that 
Burns represented less a denial of the principles of Wiley than a 
limitation on the powers of the Board. 54 These writers found a clear-
cut justification for the fact that the Board, on this reading, was 
precluded from providing a remedy in the successorship context that 
federal courts could provide: the Board was limited by the NLRA to 
either enforcing a contract as a whole or not enforcing it at all, while 
the federal courts were more flexible because of their ability to 
fashion a federal common law in the labor area. 65 
A second distinction quickly noted was that the policy in favor of 
arbitration strongly expressed in Wiley was not diminished by 
Burns. 56 Thus, even if Burns prohibited courts as well as the NLRB 
from enforcing substantive terms on unconsenting successors, it did 
not preclude enforcement of an arbitration provision. This preferred 
Corp., 468 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 912 (1973); 
NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center, Inc., 465 F.2d 1039, 1042 (6th Cir. 1972); 
Ranch Way, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 
406 U.S. 940 (1972); Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974); Nash, Successor-
ship in Light of Burns, 1 GA. L. REV. 664, 678 ( 1973). 
52. See, e.g., Morris & Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment: Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. REV. 1359 (1973); St. Antoine, 
supra note 22, at 272-77; Note, Contract Rights and the Successor Employer: The 
Impact of Burns Security, 71 MICH. L. REv. 571 (1973). 
53. See text at notes 29-30 supra. 
54. See Morris & Gaus, supra note 52; Note, supra note 52. 
55. See generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), 
Some commentators were not so ready to embrace the proposition that Burns had 
enthroned choice of forum-the courts or the NLRB-as a crucial determinant of 
the parties' substantive rights. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. 
L. REv. 50, 255-56 (1972). One commentator, although apparently agreeing that 
Burns and Wiley could be reconciled by emphasizing the contrast between the com-
mon-law flexibility of the federal courts and the limitations placed on the Board, 
Note, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of Burns, 40 U. CHI. L. REV, 617, 618-
19, 626-27 ( 1973), expressed doubts about the value of any successorship doctrine, 
id. at 627-31, and was troubled by the "judicial" power that devolves upon arbitrators 
in successorship situations, id. at 631-35. 
56. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 
726-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1971 
Term, supra note 55, at 256. 
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position for arbitration, it was urged, was appropriate because of the 
arbitrator's expertise and flexibility in adapting contract obligations to 
the circumstances of a particular successorship case. 57 
The Court's suggestion that Wiley could be distinguished from 
Burns on the basis of the merger aspects of Wiley and the background 
of state law against which it was set was generally regarded by 
commentators58 as unpersuasive in view of the fact •that the Wiley 
holding was expressly presented as a matter of federal labor law: 
While the Court in Wiley emphasized that Wiley was required under 
state law to assume the obligations and liabilities of its predecessor, 
Interscience, the Court nowhere intimated that the arbitration clause 
of the collective bargaining agreement signed by Interscience was 
binding on Wiley only through the operation of state law.59 In any 
case, resistance was natural to limiting Wiley to merger situations 
since other forms of ownership succession could be indistinguishable 
from mergers in their effect and Wiley had been applied regularly 
outside of the merger context. 60 
A final distinction between Wiley and Burns was that Wiley and 
its progeny typically had arisen in merger .or purchase-of-assets con-
texts rather than, like Burns, in the context of competitive bidding. A 
distinction based on the relationship between the two employers 
therefore seemed well founded since Burns was not a typical succes-
sorship case. 61 There had been no transfer of assets or dealings of 
any kind between Burns and Wackenhut. Justice Rehnquist, concur-
ring in Burns on the issue of contract enforcement, supported this 
distinction by arguing that ·"[i]f we deal with the legitimate expecta-
tions of employees that the employer who agreed to the collective-
bargaining contract perform it, we can require another employing 
entity to perform the contract only when he has succeeded to some of 
the tangible or intangible assets by the use of which the employees 
might have expected the first employer to have performed his contract 
with them."62 Moreover, he reasoned, to require an employer who 
has hired a competitor's former employees to honor the terms of an 
agreement between the employees and the competitor would tend to 
"import unwarranted rigidity into labor-management relations."63 
57. See Note, supra note 52, at 582-86, 590. But see St. Antoine, supra note 22, 
at 273 (expressing the view that Burns would have been decided the same way even 
if it had been a section 301 suit to secure arbitration or to enforce an arbitral award). 
58. See St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 273; Slicker, supra note 19, at 1101; Note; 
supra note 52, at 577. 
59. See note 6 supra. 
60. See cases cited in note 12 supra. 
61. See St Antoine, supra note 22, at 270 ("[11he first, and perhaps the most 
critical, point to be made about Burns is that it hardly represents a typical successor-
ship situation, if indeed it can fairly be called a successorship at all"). 
62. 406 U.S. at 305. 
63. 406 U.S. at 308. 
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Reconciliation of Burns and Wiley on the basis of the relation-
ships between the employers left open the possibility that, in a succes-
sorship case more typical than Burns, the NLRB could enforce a 
collective bargaining agreement that it found to have survived the 
change in ownership or corporate structure.64 Yet, the Burns Court's 
invocation of the national labor policy against the imposition of 
contract terms by the Board on an unconsenting party carried the 
broad implication that the Board could never enforce substantive 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement against a successor em-
ployer. Thus, notwithstanding the factual differences between Wiley 
and Burns, it was this clear implication in Burns that the Board and 
the lower courts found controlling. 65 
Despite the possibility of reconciling the holdings of Burns and 
Wiley, the two cases evinced fundamentally different attitudes toward 
the collective bargaining agreement and toward the interests at stake 
in the typical successorship situation. Whereas Wiley had taken the 
view that the collective bargaining agreement was a special sort of 
arrangement, free at times from the restrictions of ordinary contract 
law, 66 Burns seemed to signal a return to traditional contract princi-
ples. 67 Also, while Wiley emphasized the employees' need for pro-
tection in an ownership transition situation and the national policy 
favoring the avoidance of industrial strife through peaceful settlement 
of disputes by arbitration, Burns focused on the new employer's need 
for freedom to rearrange his business and the national policy support-
ing free collective bargaining. 68 It was this clear difference in atti-
tude that led one writer to conclude that "[t]he future development 
of successorship law undoubtedly depends far more on the way the 
members of the Supreme Court ultimately balance out these compet-
64. See St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 276. 
65. See, e.g., NLRB v. Polytech, Inc., 469 F.2d 1226, 1227 (8th Cir. 1972); 
Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972). See also 
Note, supra note 52, at 580. 
66. See 376 U.S. at 548-49; Morris & Gaus, supra note 52, at 1366. 
67. This shift was widely noted. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 276; 
Note, supra note 52, at 582. The conclusion, it seemed, could be drawn that "Burns 
stands for the basic proposition that a successor will not be held liable under its pred• 
ecessor's labor contract unless it has actually assumed such responsibility in fact or 
in law," Benetar, Successorship Liability Under Labor Agreements, 1973 Wis. L. Rnv. 
1026, 1035, or even that "[b]y reading Wiley and Burns together and giving vitality 
to each, the conclusion seems inescapable that the substantive terms of the contract 
survive, whether by decision of the arbitrator or the NLRB, only if the successor in 
word or deed manifests an intent to be bound thereby." Slicker, supra note 19, at 
1102. See also Pate, The Impact of Burns, 1 GA. L. Rnv. 687, 693 (1973). This 
would seem to destroy most of Wiley's force, for it would eliminate an arbitrator's 
power to bind an unwilling successor to substantive terms of a labor agreement to 
which it was not a party. The courts seem to have been unwilling to take Burns 
this far. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 
725-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). 
68. See 406 U.S. at 287-90. 
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ing values than on any logical deductions from Wiley and Burns."69 
That the principles of Wiley had not been totally abrogated by 
Burns was made clear in the Supreme Court's third successor-em-
ployer decision, Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB.70 That case 
presented the issue whether a successor employer could be required 
by the NLRB to remedy the unfair labor practices of its predecessor. 
Prior to Golden State Bottling Company's sale of its soft drink bottling 
and distribution business to All American Beverages, the NLRB had 
found that Golden State committed an unfair labor practice in dis-
charging a certain driver-salesman and had ordered Golden State, "its 
officers, agents, successors, and assigns," to reinstate him with back 
pay. All American acquired the business as a bona fide purchaser, 
but with knowledge of the outstanding Board order, and continued to 
operate the enterprise "without interruption or substantial changes in 
method of operation, employee complement, or supervisory person-
nel."71 The Board concluded that All American was a "successor" 
for purposes of the NLRA and ordered All American to reinstate the 
driver-salesman; Golden State and All American were held jointly 
and severally liable for the driver's back pay.72 The order was en-
forced by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 73 
The Supreme Court affirmed and thereby gave its approval for 
the first time to the Board's Perma Vinyl74 doctrine that a successor 
employer must remedy the unfair labor practices of its predecessor. 
The Court rejected the argument that the Board's issuance of a 
reinstatment and back pay order against a bona fide successor was 
barred by section lO(c) of the NLRA,75 which authorizes remedial 
orders only against "such persons" as the Board has found to have 
engaged in an unfair labor practice. The Court stated that it had 
"[e]arly on" found that the Board's remedial powers under section 
lO(c) extended beyond the actual perpetrator of an unfair labor 
practice and "applied, not only to a new employer who is 'merely a 
disguised continuance of the old employer,' . . . but also 'in appro-
priate circumstances . . . [to] those to whom the business may have 
been transferred, whether as a means of evading the judgment or for 
other reasons.' "76 
69. St. Antoine, supra note 22, at 277. 
70. 414 U.S. 168 (1973). 
71. 414 U.S. at 170-71. 
72. 187 N.L.R.B. 1017 (1971). 
73. 467 F..2d 164 (1972). 
74. Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub nom. United 
States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968). 
75. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). 
76. 414 U.S. at 176, quoting Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 
106 (1942), and Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945) (emphasis 
added by the Court). 
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Finally, the Court concluded that the Board's order equitably 
balanced "the conflicting legitimate interests of the bona fide succes-
sor, the public, and the affected employee,"77 and that the Board, in 
emphasizing the need to protect the victimized employee, had prop-
erly relied on Wiley.78 In the Court's view, however, its holding "in 
no way"79 qualified Burns: 
[U]nlike Burns, where an important labor policy opposed saddling 
the successor employer with the obligations of the collective-bargain-
ing agreement, there is no underlying congressional policy here 
militating against the imposition of liability. 
[Moreover, a]voidance of labor strife, prevention of a deterrent 
effect on the exercise of rights [regarding union activities] guaranteed 
employees by§ 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and protection for the 
victimized employee-all mportant policies subserved by the National 
Labor Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C § 141-are achieved [here] at a 
relatively minimal cost to the bona fide successor. 80 
Golden State demonstrated the continuing vitality of Wiley's 
policy in favor of affording employees protection in a transition situa-
tion at some expense to the successor employer. But the case sug-
gested no new standards for determining when duties are properly 
imposed on a successor. The Court did note that the labor-law doc-
trine of successorship applied not only to the merger situation of 
Wiley but also to purchases of assets because, "so long as there is a 
continuity in the 'employmg industry,' the public policies underlying 
the doctrine will be served by its broad application."81 However, in 
view of the transfer of assets from Golden State to All American, 
the continuity in operations, and the continuity of identity of the work 
force, the Court was not compelled to analyze the factors involved in 
the Board's finding of a continuing business enterprise. 
II. A CRITIQUE OF Howard Johnson 
It was in light of Burns, Wiley, and Golden State, that the 
Supreme Court decided its most recent successorship case, Howard 
Johnson. Howard Johnson Company made a bona fide purchase of 
the personal property used in the operation of a motor lodge and 
restaurant, and leased the underlying real property, from the Grissom 
family, which had owned and operated the enterprises under fran-
77. 414 U.S. at 181. 
78. 414 U.S. at 181-82. 
79. 414 U.S. at 184. Golden State clearly put to rest the doubt expressed by 
one writer, Swerdlow, Freedom of Contract in Labor Law: Burns, H.K. Porter, and 
Section 8(d), 51 TExAs L REV. 1, 15 (1972), that the Perma Vinyl doctrine could 
survive Burns. 
80. 414 U.S. at 185. 
81. 414 U.S. at 183 n.S. 
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chise agreements with Howard Johnson. The collective bargaining 
agreements entered into by the Grissoms and the union representing 
the employees at both establishments82 contained arbitration clauses 
and provided that the agreements would be binding upon the Gris-
soms' "successors, assigns, purchasers, lessees or transferees." How-
ard Johnson, however, explicitly refused to assume any of the Gris-
soms' labor obligations, and, while Howard Johnson continued to 
operate the enterprises in substantially the same manner as had the 
Grissoms, it hired only nine of the Grissoms' fifty-three employees in 
assembling its work force of forty-five. In response, the union filed a 
section 301 suit to compel Howard Johnson to arbitrate under the 
agreements signed by the Grissoms. 83 
on· review,84 the Supreme Court held that Howard Johnson was 
under no duty to arbitrate. In so doing, the Court found it necessary, 
first, to apply Burns and, second, to distinguish Wiley. In brief, the 
Court stated that, because the same national labor policies govern the 
NLRB and the courts, the policies of Burns were applicable to section 
301 suits as well as to actions before the NLRB. - From Burns the 
Court extracted the rule that a successor employer could not be 
compelled to hire any of its predecessor's employees. Applying this 
rule in Howard Johnson, the Court concluded that an arbitration 
order was inappropriate because the union's principal purpose in 
seeking arbitration was to compel the hiring of the Grissom employ-
ees not retained by Howard Johnson. The Court then endeavored to 
demonstrate that Wiley did not dictate a different result. It distin-
guished that case on two factual grounds: First, Wiley was a merger 
cas~, which meant that it was set against a background of state law 
imposing duties on the successor, and that, since Interscience disap-
peared in the merger, the employees had no remedy unless they 
could obtain relief from the successor. Second, in Wiley there was 
continuity in the identity of the work force. This continuity meant 
that the union's section 301 suit was brought on behalf of employees 
working for the successor employer rather than on behalf of those not 
retained. Moreover, the Court said, this continuity was necessary to 
82. The restaurant employees were represented by the Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees and Bartenders International Union, and the motor lodge employees by Local 
75 of the Hotel, Motel, and Restaurant Employees Union. Since the two unions were 
"apparently identical in interest and goveman!=e," Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit 
Local Joint Exec. Bd., 482 F.2d 489, 491 n.3 (6th Cir. 1973), and since both were 
represented in this litigation by the Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, they will 
be referred to herein as "the union," as they were by the Supreme Court. See 417 
U.S. at 251 & n.1. 
83. The district court held that Howard Johnson was required to arbitrate the ex-
tent of its obligations under the agreements, although it refused to issue a preliminary 
injunction requiring Howard Johnson to hire all Grissom employees. Detroit Local 
Joint Exec. Bd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2329 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affd., 
482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973). 
84. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
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the finding of the continuity of the business enterprise on which the 
duty to arbitrate in Wiley was based. 
The remainder of this Note examines in detail the significance of 
the Court's reasoning at each of these steps and considers the merits 
of a possible new approach to successorship problems that the Court 
suggested in a footnote in Howard Johnson. 
In determining that the principles of Burns were applicable to 
section 301 suits, the Court appeared to undercut the importance of 
the distinction between the NLRB and the federal courts-a distinc-
tion upon which commentators had relied in attempting to reconcile 
Burns and Wiley. Burns applied, the Court stated, because the 
power of the federal courts to fashion a federal common law in 
section 301 suits, expressly recognized in Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 85 could properly be exercised only in consonance with 
the principles of the NLRA, the same body of law that governs the 
NLRB. "It would be plainly inconsistent with this view," the Court 
reasoned, "to say that the basic policies found controlling in an unfair 
labor practice context may be disregarded by the courts in a suit 
under § 301, and thus to permit the rights enjoyed by the new 
employer in a successorship context to depend upon the forum in 
which the union presses its claims."86 Although the Court did not 
explain to which "basic policies" it was alluding, it arguably implied 
that courts as well as the NLRB are bound by the strong national 
policy, discussed in Burns, against the imposition of labor-contract 
terms on unconsenting parties. If this implication is correct and 
courts are barred from imposing contract terms, then it is no longer 
possible to reconcile Burns and Wiley on the basis of differences in 
the forums. 
The Court's apparent implication that courts and the NLRB are 
not permitted to reach different results on the extent of a successor 
employer's labor-law obligations also seems to undermine the distinc-
tion between Burns and Wiley based on the fact that Wiley involved 
the enforcement of an arbitration clause. 87 Since, under Burns, the 
NLRB apparently can never impose contract terms on unconsenting 
parties, inconsistent results can be avoided totally only if courts are 
similarly precluded from enforcing any contract provisions, including 
arbitration clauses. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the policy rea-
sons favoring arbitration as a method of settling disputes would 
support the creation of an exception to this blanket prohibition of 
judicial enforcement of contract terms since the Court in Howard 
Johnson, in concluding that arbitration was inappropriate, nowhere 
mentioned the national policy favoring arbitration. 
85. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
86. 417 U.S. at 256. 
81. See text at notes 56-57 supra. 
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Still, the Howard Johnson Court stopped short of holding that 
Wiley and Burns are irreconcilable. This can perhaps be explained 
by the fact that, although the Court implied that it favored the Burns 
policy against the imposition of contract terms on an unwilling party, 
it did not rely on this policy in reaching its result. Instead, it 
extracted from Burns only a specific rule that a successor employer is 
free not to hire his predecessor's employees88 and a general policy 
favoring the free transfer and reorganization of business. Thus, 
while Howard Johnson reflects Burns' emphasis on the rights of the 
successor employer rather than Wiley's concern for the protection of 
employees, it does leave room for the continued application of Wiley. 
This is true because, while the rule that a successor employer cannot 
be compelled to retain its predecessor's employees restricts Wiley, it 
does not preclude the enforcement of arbitration directed toward 
other employee claims. In essence, the Court in Howard Johnson 
was unwilling to allow the union to circumvent this specific rule by 
seeking to force rehiring through a section 301 suit to compel arbitra-
tion. · 
Thus, it is possible to view Howard Johnson as holding merely 
88. The Court stated, "Clearly, Burns establishes that Howard Johnson had the 
right not to hire any of the former Grissom employees, if it so desired." 414 U.S. 
at 262. This statement is qualified by an appended footnote, which observes that 
the new employer commits an unfair labor practice if he refuses to hire former em-
ployees solely because of their union membership "or to avoid having to recognize 
the union." 417 U.S. at 262 n.8. But this right, even as qualified by the Court's 
footnote, is not so clear on the face of Burns. The Howard Johnson conclusion rests 
on the statements in Burns that a potential employer may be willing to take over 
a business only if he can make various changes in it, including changes in the labor 
force, 406 U.S. at 287-88, and that, if the Board's position were not reversed in that 
case, "[i]t would seemingly follow that employees of the predecessor would be 
deemed employees of the successor, dischargeable only in accordance with provisions 
of the contract and subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions thereof. Bums 
would not have been free to replace Wackenhut's guards with its own except as the 
contract permitted." 406 U.S. at 288, quoted in 417 U.S. at 261-62. The Court's 
reaction in Burns was quite a natural one. It would seem unjust and impractical in 
a competitive bidding situation to impose a duty on an employer to hire his competi-
tor's employees simply because he had won a contract at the location where those 
employees worked. The result might be less unjust, however, when a new employer 
has acquired an ongoing business. In this situation, the burden of such a duty on 
the employer could be balanced against the interests of the employees involved. 
Wiley could be read as implying such a duty for the successor employer, and the 
NLRB even appeared to be moving in that direction in a case decided shortly after 
Wiley, Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965). But no such distinction seems 
to have been made by the courts, and the Court's conclusion in Howard Johnson was 
not a novel one. In Golden State, for instance, it said "the purchaser is not obligated 
by the Act to hire any of the predecessor's employees." 414 U.S. at 184 n.6. 
Nevertheless, Golden State itself demonstrated that, under special circumstances, 
the successor employer could be compelled to rehire an individual employee of the 
predecessor. Stated more precisely, then, the rule is that the successor employer who 
does not assume his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement has the right not 
to hire any of the predecessor's employees (in the sense that he is under no contract 
obligation to hire them) and his failure to hire them is not in itself an unfair labor 
practice. 
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that Burns applies in section 301 suits only in so far as it proscribes 
requiring a successor employer to hire his predecessor's employees. 
Limiting the Howard Johnson holding in this manner leaves room for 
the accommodation of Burns and Wiley under the balancing test, 
discussed below, that is discernible from Howard Johnson, and ra-
tionally explains the Court's refusal to conclude that its decision 
overruled Wiley. 
Upon finding Burns applicable and a bar to arbitration in How-
ard Johnson, the Court turned to distinguishing Wiley, which the 
lower courts had found to be controlling and to compel arbitration. 
While the Court found Wiley inapplicable to the facts before it, it 
distinguished the case in such a way as to suggest that Wiley might 
have continuing vitality. The two primary factual distinctions that 
the Court observed between Wiley and Howard Johnson were that 
Wiley involved a merger rather than a sale of assets and that Wiley 
retained essentially all of the Interscience employees whereas Howard 
Johnson hired only a few of the Grissom employees. Each of these 
differences was significant for two reasons. 
The merger aspect of Wiley was important, in the Court's view, 
first, because the background of state law obligating the surviving 
corporation "suggest[ed] that holding Wiley bound to arbitrate un-
der its predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement [might] have 
been fairly within the reasonable expectations of the parties."89 But, 
the Court's attempt to distinguish Wiley on this "background of state 
law'' basis, like its attempt to do so in Burns, 00 is unpersuasive in view 
of the emphasis in Wiley on federal labor policies and on the federal 
rather than state character of its holding. And, although the "reason-
able expectations of the parties" does seem to be a consideration 
relevant to the imposition of a duty to arbitrate, the Court apparently 
neglected several factors in Howard Johnson bearing on such expecta-
tions. In Howard Johnson, the business was continued in the same 
location, under the same name, and using a similar mode of opera-
tion. Moreover, there was a significant nexus between the two 
employers in the transfer of physical assets and in the former fran-
chise relationship. In light of Wiley and of these various indicia of 
successorship that have led to the survival of labor obligations, arbi-
tration could well have been within the reasonable expectations of the 
parties in Howard Johnson. Perhaps the Court concluded that 
arbitration is not reasonably expected by the parties where, as in 
Howard Johnson, the carry-over of employees between the two enter-
prises is less than substantial. If so, Wiley might still apply where 
there is substantial work force continuity, whether or not a merger is 
involved. 
89. 417U.S.at257. 
90. See text at note 59 supra. 
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The Court's second reason for considering the merger aspect of 
Wiley important involved the availability to the union of alternative 
means to enforce obligations undertaken by the predecessor em-
ployer. 91 In Wiley, the predecessor disappeared in the merger and 
thus left the union without a remedy unless one was available against 
the successor. In Howard Johnson, however, the former employer, 
the Grissom family, not only was still in existence ''with substantial 
retained assets," but was willing to arbitrate the extent of its liability 
under the agreement. Moreover, although the successor clause in the 
agreement was wholly ineffective to bind the unconsenting buyer, the 
Grissom family still remained liable for its breach. 
The availability of a realistic remedy against the predecessor 
employer does seem to be at least a partial justification for the denial 
of an arbitration order against the new employer.92 The Court's use 
of this factor is significant. By distinguishing Wiley on the ground 
that the union in Howard Johnson had "a realistic remedy" against 
the Grissoms, 93 the Court again implied that Wiley could have vitality 
outside the merger context since there may well be sellers of 
businesses from whom, realistically, no more relief can be obtained 
than from a merged corporation. The Grissoms, after all, were in the 
position to satisfy a damage award entered against them: they re-
tained a continuing income from the lease of property to Howard 
Johnson, a circumstance hardly universal in sale of assets cases. If, 
as Howard Johnson implies, the possibility of remedy against a 
former employer will preclude the imposition on the successor of a 
duty to arbitrate only when the remedy is a realistic one, then arbi-
tration will not be precluded in every sale of assets case. 
If Howard Johnson is read as stating that Wiley potentially ap-
plies whenever a "realistic" remedy for the employees is lacking, it 
becomes necessary to determine what remedies are "realistic." A 
remedy is a "realistic" alternative from the employees' point of view 
only if it can adequately compensate for the relief that they might 
obtain were the successor employer required to arbitrate. The nature 
of the relief obtainable through such arbitration is therefore relevant 
to the issue whether the availability of some other remedy should be a 
bar to arbitration. If the employees' recovery through arbitration is 
limited to the satisfaction of claims that accrued or that in some sense 
"vested"94 under the old employer, then it would seem reasonable to 
91. See 417 U.S. at257-58. 
92. Indeed, this point was noted shortly after Wiley itself. See Shaw & Carter, 
supra note 10, at 366-69. The availability of a remedy against the predecessor seems 
to have influenced courts occasionally, but has never been controlling. See, e.g., Mc-
Guire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 1966). 
93. 417 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added). 
94. The union in Wiley claimed that the rights it sought to enforce through arbi-
tration had "vested" in the employees under the collective bargaining agreement. 376 
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lay the burden of satisfaction solely on the old employer if recovery 
against him is practicable. Howard Johnson suggests, however, that 
Wiley also provides those employees retained in a business transfer 
some protection against "sudden changes in the terms and conditions 
of their employment."95 This implies that retained employees may 
indeed have rights, other than the narrowly defined ones accrued 
before the transfer, over which arbitration would be appropriate. If 
those rights relate to the terms and conditions upon which employees 
are retained by the successor employer, full relief for their violation 
may be available only from the new employer. In such a situation, 
the continued existence of the predecessor should not automatically 
bar the imposition of obligations on the successor. Instead, courts 
should balance the relevant interests in an effort to determine 
whether money damages adequately compensate the employee for 
the nonenforcement of the term, and sufficiently protect him from 
the impact of changes in the terms and conditions of employment, to 
justify freeing the successor employer from a duty to arbitrate. 00 
U.S. at 545. The rights at issue included seniority status, pension contributions, job 
security and grievance provisions, severance pay, and vacation pay, all of which the 
union sought to have accorded the employees "now and after January 30, 1962," the 
expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement. 376 U.S. at 552. 
Arguably, Wiley can be limited to the imposition of a duty to arbitrate over only 
those rights that "vested" prior to the transfer of ownership. It is difficult to define 
"vested," however, without including all rights that an employee might have under 
a collective bargaining agreement. Yet, NLRB Member Jenkins dissented from the 
Board's action in Burns on the ground that Wiley applied only when vested rights 
were at issue. In his view, the rights at issue in Wiley were rights "which were fixed 
or already accrued by being, at least in part, earned through past performance of 
work .... " William J. Bums Intl. Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 
(1970). Moreover, the Court in Howard Johnson stated that "the disappearance of 
the original employing entity in the Wiley merger meant that unless the union were 
afforded some remedy against Wiley, it would have no means to enforce the obliga-
tions voluntarily undertaken by the merged corporation, to the extent that those obli-
gations vested prior to the merger or to the extent that its promises were intended 
to survive a change of ownership." 417 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added), While lower 
courts applying Wiley have not distinguished between vested and nonvested rights, 
see, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir, 
1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 
1964); cf. United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 
1974) (enforcing an arbitrator's order that a successor employer honor the dues 
check off and wage reopener provisions of its predecessor's agreement), future cases 
attempting to reconcile Wiley, Burns, and Howard Johnson may well attempt to make 
such a distinction. 
95. 417 U.S. at 264. 
96. The Howard Johnson Court noted that, in the case before it, the union could 
have sought to enjoin the sale of the business as a breach of the successorship clause 
of the collective bargaining agreement. The Court did not decide, however, whether 
this particular remedy standing alone is sufficiently realistic to preclude application 
of Wiley. It would seem that in many situations, this remedy is not a realistic one, 
The remedy is available, of course, only when there is a successorship clause in the 
agreement, and the remedy must be sought before the transfer takes place. In many 
instances, however, the union has little or no time in which to act prior to the trans-
fer, and the possibility of an injunction may simply be a further incentive for employ-
ers to maximize the secrecy of their transactions. Indeed, potential successor em-
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The presence or absence of a realistic alternative remedy is also a 
partial justification for the apparently differing standards that the 
Court has used to determine when particular labor obligations survive 
a change in ownership. The Court's general reluctance to impose 
contract obligations on a successor employer is perhaps justifiable on 
the ground that there is often a remedy available against the contract-
ing predecessor employer. The Court's greater willingness to require 
the successor employer to bargain with the union might similarly 
follow from the fact that it is impossible to obtain adequate alterna-
tive relief from the predecessor. Finally, the fact that unfair labor 
practices may be adequately remedied only by the successor employer 
helps explain Golden State, where the successor was ordered to 
reinstate an employee of its predecessor and was held jointly liable 
with the predecessor for back pay. That the Court desired to accord 
full relief is evidenced by the fact that it held both employers liable 
for the unfair labor practice. 
It is of course clear, however, that the absence of a realistic 
remedy against the predecessor employer cannot alone justify the 
imposition of labor obligations on the successor, for other circum-
stances and policies may preclude this result. In particular, continu-
ity of identity of the business enterprise remains a condition to the 
application of Wiley. 
The second and more decisive ground upon which the Howard 
Johnson Court distinguished Wiley was that Wiley had voluntarily 
employed essentially all of the Interscience employees while Howard 
Johnson had chosen its own work force. This fact was significant in 
the first instance because, unlike the union in Wiley, which repre-
sented employees who stayed at their jobs through the transfer, the 
union in Howard Johnson represented employees of the Grissoms 
who had not been retained, and the union's primary objective was to 
force their reinstatement. In Howard Johnson, but not in Wiley, 
ployers were already being advised to say as little regarding the transfer as possible 
to the union involved. See Rovins & Rosen, Labor Law Obligations of Parties to 
the Sale of a Business, 25 LAB. L.J. 231,238 (1974). 
Even where an injunction halting the transfer is feasible, the fact that the union 
has failed to seek injunctive relief should not bar a remedy against the successor em-
ployer if there is no further remedy against the former employer. First, the union 
may not know whether the transfer will have an adverse impact on its interests until 
the transfer has occurred and the new employer has made clear his intentions. Sec-
ond, if unions are forced to seek injunctive relief to avoid forfeiting their claims, the 
result may well be to embroil many transfers in time-consuming litigation that frus-
trates the national policy frequently espoused by the Court of facilitating the free 
flow of capital. Finally, it will be possible in many instances for courts to make 
available the usual contract remedies of damages and specific performance. In such 
instances, there is little logic behind withdrawing these normal remedies and requir-
ing employees to pursue a particular remedy that may be less desirable from their 
point of view. 
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therefore, the union's purpose ran directly counter to the right of the 
new employer to hire his own work force. 97 
In light of the union's purpose in Howard Johnson, the Court 
could have rested its decision solely on the proposition that the right 
to continued employment is not a contract right that can survive a 
change in ownership of a business. Instead, it proceeded to find the 
lack of work force continuity important for a second reason: The 
continuity of the business enterprise required by Wiley before a duty 
to arbitrate can be imposed, the Court asserted, exists only where 
there is continuity of identity of the work force. 98 Because work 
force continuity was lacking in Howard Johnson, this assertion car-
ried the implication that the union was barred not only from seeking 
arbitration over the reinstatement of employees, but also from seeking 
to enforce other rights under the collective bargaining agreement on 
behalf either of those hired by Howard Johnson or of those not 
retained. 99 
It is not apparent why the number of employees retained by the 
successor employer should in itself be determinative of the availability 
of relief for benefits accrued under an agreement with the predeces-
sor. If the rights sought to be enforced are vested in the narrow sense 
of having accrued prior to the transfer, such as rights to accrued 
vacation or severence pay, it should not matter whether those repre-
sented by the union are presently employed by the successor. This is 
not to say that continuity of identity of the work force is or should be 
irrelevant. Work force continuity is clearly relevant in determining 
whether there exists the requisite continuity of identity of the business 
enterprise. Moreover, when the dispute is over union-wide rights, 
such as dues check-offs, rather than over strictly individual employee 
rights, continuity of identity of the work force may even be the 
controlling consideration. It is unnecessary, however, to bar arbitra-
tion over all claims just because a lack of continuity in the work force 
generally affects the rights and remedies claimed by a union. 
As the ultimate basis for its holding, the Court's conclusion that 
work force continuity is a prerequisite to the imposition of a duty to 
arbitrate suffers from certain flaws. First of all, the conclusion is 
vulnerable to the argument, made by the lower courts in this case and 
repeated by Justice, Douglas in his dissent, 100 that the majority was 
97. 417 U.S. at 258-62. 
98. 417 U.S. at 263-64. 
99. Thus, a California court, applying Howard Johnson, refused to distinguish the 
case before it on the basis that the union there was seeking to enforce contract terms 
for the benefit of employees of the defendant; the court held that, in the absence 
of evidence of substantial continuity in the work force, the buyer of a restaurant was 
not obligated to recognize the union that represented the seller's employees or to ad-
here to their collective bargaining agreement. See Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. 3539 
Century, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 821, 824-25, 121 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42-43 (1975). 
100. 417 U.S. at 267, citing 482 F .2d at 493. 
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bootstrapping by saying in effect that because Howard Johnson did 
not hire the Grissoms' employees it was under no duty to hire them. 
Clearly, an employer's failure to fulfill a duty is no evidence that he 
had no such duty. In representation cases, the fact that an employer 
has wrongfully refused to hire members of a union does not in itself 
protect him from an action by the union. The employer could be 
ordered by the NLRB to recognize and bargain with the union, even 
though he had apparently succeeded in preventing a union majority in 
the new work force.101 The Court could have avoided this logical 
trap by basing its decision solely on the proposition that a successor 
need not arbitrate over hiring (or firing) the employees of his prede-
cessor. 
A further problem with the Court's conclusion is the difficulty in 
applying it. The Court said that a "substantial continuity in the 
identity of the work force"102 is required before there can be such 
continuity of identity of the business enterprise as will make Wiley 
applicable. In explanation, the Court stated only that "[t]he Wiley 
Court seemingly recognized this, ·as it found the requisite continuity 
present there in reliance on the 'wholesale transfer' of Interscience 
employees to Wiley,"103 and that the lower courts had reflected this 
view in their emphasis on "whether the successor employer hires a 
majority of the predecessor's employees . . . in § 301 suits under 
Wiley."104 The Court's use of the term "substantial" leaves room for 
some flexibility in deciding whether the requisite work force continu-
ity is present in individual cases. The reference to lower court deci-
sions, however, suggests that the Court considered the determining 
factor to be whether a majority of the predecessor's employees are 
hired, although in at least one of the cases cited by the Court1°5 the 
retained employees constituted a majority of the successor's work 
force but not a majority of the predecessor's work force. 
There is little reason why a continuity of identity of the enterprise 
can exist only where a majority of the predecessor's employees has 
been retained. In representation cases, a majority test is justified: 
Unless, as in Burns, a majority of the new work force is made up of 
101. See K.B. & J. Young's Super Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463, 465 
(9th Cir. 1967). Cf. NLRB v. Bums Intl. Security Servs. Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279-
80 (1972) ("It goes without saying, of course, that Bums was not entitled to upset 
what it should have accepted as an established union majority by soliciting represen-
tation cards for another union and thereby committing the unfair labor practice of 
which it was found guilty by the Board"). 
102. 417 U.S. at 263. 
103. 417 U.S. at 263. 
104. 417 U.S. at 263-64 (footnote omitted). 
105. Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel Employees v. Joden, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 390 (D. 
Mass. 1966), cited in 417 U.S. at 264 n.10 (continuity of business enterprise evi-
denced by a "significant number" of predecessor's employees where successor hired 
12 of predecessor's 29 or 30 employees for new work force of 18 or 19). 
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workers formerly employed by the predecessor, the union represent-
ing the retained employees cannot be presumed to have rthe support 
of a majority of the new work force. But, clearly this Burns majority 
test need not be satisfied in the arbitration context. Indeed, in Wiley 
itself, the union represented only a small minority of the new work 
force, yet still had the right to arbitrate.106 The situation can arise in 
which only a minority of the predecessor's employees are retained, but 
those employees constitute a majority of the new work force. The 
successor employer in such a case will be obliged under Burns to 
recognize and bargain with the incumbent union if other factors 
support a finding of successorship to the business enterprise. But if a 
separate majority test must be met for Wiley to apply, that is, if a 
majority of the predecessor's employees must be retained, then arbi-
tration under the predecessor's contract will not be required. There 
is no apparent justification for such a rigid result. Moreover, in view 
of the degree to which successorship cases in different contexts draw 
upon each other, confusion seems likely to result from the establish-
ment of a "majority of the work force" test in arbitration cases 
different from that applied in representation cases. 
In determining whether continuity in the work force exists suffi-
cient to support an arbitration order under Wiley, the best approach is 
to eschew any mechanistic majority test and decide whether there 
exists "substantial continuity in the identity of the work force" on the 
facts of each case. i-o7 Such an approach is not unduly favorable to 
the union in arbitration cases, for, whether or not measured by a strict 
majority test, continuity of identity of the work force is only one 
element of the required continuity of the business enterprise.108 Just 
as a new: employer will not be ordered to recognize and bargain with 
an incumbent union where a change in size of the work force or other 
aspect of the operation has rendered the bargaining unit inappro-
priate, even though a majority of his employees formerly worked for 
his predecessor, so too the new employer will not be obliged to 
arbitrate in the face of such changes. Furthermore, the arbitrator in 
successorship cases may properly consider the effect of a change in 
the size of the work force, as well as other changes in the business 
106. See 376 U.S. at 551 n.5. 
107. This seems to have been the approach taken in post-Howard Johnson cases 
so far. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists, 504 F.2d 307, 320 
(5th Cir. 1974) (retention of 35% of old work force, which constituted 39% of new 
work force, held to be insufficient continuity in case of successorship through com-
petitive bidding for service contract); Local 775, Retail Clerks Union v. Purity 
Stores, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 3d 225, 230-31, 116 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42-43 (1974) (retention 
of "a considerable number of employees," though less than a majority, held sufficient 
to obligate buyer of grocery who came under "new owner" terms of seller's collective 
bargaining agreement). 
108. Boeing Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists, 504 F.2d 307, 321 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
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operation, in deciding whether it is appropriate to enforce the old 
collective bargaining agreement.109 In light of Howard Johnson's 
mandate that continuity of identity of the work force be determina-
tive of a successor employer's duty to arbitrate, a case-by-case deter-
mination of the substantiality of such continuity seems desirable. 
ill. FOOTNOTE 9-A NEW BALANCING APPROACH 
Because of the numerous factual differences among successorship 
cases, the variety of obligations that might survive a change in owner-
ship, and the varying strengths of the interests of employers and 
employees, a case-by-case evaluation of all the factors in every succes-
sorship case seems most appropriate. The Supreme Court apparently 
reached this conclusion in footnote 9 in Howard Johnson. In that 
note, the Court rejected the approach, taken by many lower courts in 
successorship cases, of deciding first that the employer is a "succes-
sor" and then asking whether a "successor employer'' has the legal 
obligation at issue: 
But the real question in each of these "successorship" cases is, on 
the particular facts, what are the legal obligations of the new employer 
to the employees of the former owner or their representative. The 
answer to this inquiry requires analysis of the interests of the new 
employer and the employees and of the policies of the labor laws 
in light of the facts of each case and the particular legal obligation 
which is at issue, whether it be •the duty to recognize and bargain 
with the union, the duty to remedy unfair labor practices, the duty 
to arbitrate, etc. There is, and can be, no single definition of "suc-
cessor" which iis applicable in every legal context. A new employer, 
in other words, may be a successor for some purposes and not for 
others.110 
This approach toward successorship· law seems reasonable, for the 
balancing suggested by the Court allows for the needed diversity in 
results within a framework of law. 
Perhaps the primary deterrent to lower-court use of the test is that 
the Court did not appear to employ it in Howard J ohnsqn. Undenia-
bly, the Court deliberately confined its findings as to Howard John-
son's successorship status to the issue of the obligation to arbitrate 
and refrained from applying ( or denying) the label of "successor 
employer" for any other purpose. Furthermore, the Court did note 
some of the factors properly considered in applying the balancing 
109. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 355 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 
1964). 
110. 417 U.S. at 262-63 n.9. Earlier in its opinion the Court stated that "[p]ar-
ticularly in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the myriad factual 
circumstances and legal contexts -in which it can arise, and the absence of congres-
sional guidance as to its resolution, emphasis on the facts of each case as it arises 
is especially appropriate." 417 U.S. at 256. 
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test-the circumstances surrounding the sale as they bore on the 
· reasonable expectations of the parties and on the availability of 
alternative remedies, and the policies against compelling the new 
employer to hire his predecessor's employees. Nevertheless, the 
Court failed to carry through on the balancing approach in two ways: 
It resorted to arbitrary rules of law instead of evaluating the case in 
terms of the interests and policies involved, and it failed to analyze 
with particularity the obligation at issue. 
One rule insisted upon by the Court was that the new employer 
had the right not to hire any of his predecessor's employees. But 
Golden State demonstrates that this successor employer right is not 
absolute.111 No harm in this instance, however, flowed from the 
Court's fajlure to acknowledge that this "rule" of law can be overrid-
den by opposing considerations, because the result reached was a 
reasonable one on the basis of the facts and interests involved. No 
special circumstances like those in Golden State counterbalanced the 
employer's interest in rearranging the business through changes in 
personnel and the societal interest in encouraging the free flow of 
capital and economic efficiency. In view of the great burden that 
would have fallen on Howard Johnson had it been required to hire 
the Grissoms' employees, and in view of the availability of other relief 
for those employees, the Court was warranted in refusing to require 
Howard Johnson to arbitrate. 
The Court in Howard Johnson, however, also propounded an-
other, considerably less justifiable, rule of law-that the continuity of 
identity of the business enterprise requisite to the imposition of an 
obligation to -arbitrate under Wiley "necessarily includes . . . a 
substantial continuity in the identity of the work force across the 
change in ownership."112 As discussed above, 113 continuity of identity 
of the business enterprise may be evidenced by a number of factors 
and itself is but one of the factors bearing on the balancing-of-
interests test suggested in footnote 9. Work force continuity has long 
been recognized as an important element, but it need not, under a 
balancing of interests approach, be conclusive on the issue of the 
obligation to arbitrate. The Court's categorical statement, therefore, 
is inconsistent with the balancing approach that it suggested. 
The Court seemed to find this categorical rule necessary to justify 
its denial of arbitration in Howard Johnson. In so doing, the Court 
failed to identify clearly the obligation at issue and thus again fell 
short of carrying through on the balancing approach. Had the Court 
more consistently recognized that the issue in Howard Johnson was 
the specific obligation to rehire the old employees rather than simply 
111. See text at notes 70-81 supra. 
112. 417 U.S. at 263. 
113. See text at notes 16-22 supra. 
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the general duty to arbitrate, it could have reached the result it 
desired without laying down this categorical limitation on both the 
obligation to arbitrate and the balancing test itself. A balancing of 
the interests in Howard Johnson would have supported the conclusion 
that Howard Johnson was not obliged to hire the Grissoms' employ-
ees. Because the union's primary object in seeking arbitration was to 
compel such hiring, it should therefore have also supported the conclu-
sion that arbitration should be denied. · 
The Court's failure to focus on the specific obligation at issue in 
Howard Johnson in balancing the opposing interests apparently fol-
lowed from its adoption of a unitary view of the duty to arbitrate. In 
footnote 9, the Court spoke only of general categories of obligations: 
"the duty to recognize and bargain with the union, the duty to remedy 
unfair labor practices, the duty to arbitrate, etc." A proper balancing 
of interests, however, can occur only if a court looks behind the 
general duty and analyzes the specific obligation at issue.114 The 
"duty to remedy unfair labor practices," for example, might entail 
reinstating a single employee or recognizing a union. The relative 
strength of the relevant factors in these two situations clearly would 
vary drastically. Similarly, the duty to arbitrate might be the focal 
point of disputes over a number of different possible contractual obli-
gations, the interests surrounding each of which might balance differ-
ently. A union might be seeking the enforcement of contract terms 
relating to working conditions or the recovery of benefits accrued 
under the former employer. The burden on the successor employer 
and the relevance of a solvent predecessor's continued existence both 
clearly differ according to which of these two remedies the union 
seeks from arbitration. And, in implementing the footnote 9 balanc-
ing test, courts can and must consider the varying impact of these 
factors. The relevance of the composition of the new work force will 
also vary. But by stating in Howard Johnson that arbitration should 
be denied whenever continuity of identity in the work force is lacking, 
the Court in effect conclusively presumed that work force continuity 
is always relevant and thereby limited the ability of lower courts to 
balance accurately the interests in each case. This seems an unfortu-
nate result of needlessly general language, for, contrary to the Court's 
assertion in Howard Johnson, the result was not necessary to a 
reconciliation of "the protection afforded employee interests in a 
change of ownership in Wiley ... with the new employer's right to 
operate the enterprise with his own independent labor force."115 
Even though Howard Johnson itself failed to employ fully the 
114. The California court failed to recognize this in Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. 3539 
Century, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 821, 826, 121 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 (1975). The court 
cited the broad categories of obligations listed in Howard Johnson and refused to 
analyze the claimed subjects for arbitration. 
115. 417 U.S. at 264. 
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balancing approach that it suggested, the approach does merit further 
development. While the footnote in Howard Johnson is sketchy, 
prior successorship cases identifying the various relevant considera-
tions may be drawn upon to clarify the Court's meaning. In general 
terms, the interests of the employer and of the employees are apt to be 
similar from case to case. The new employer's interest lies in maxim-
izing his freedom to reorganize his business and in minimizing his 
labor obligations. The employees, on the other hand, seek to retain 
their jobs and whatever benefits they have accrued under their former 
employer with as little disruption of the conditions of their employ-
ment as possible. Because the interests in specific cases are more 
particular, and vary in weight according to the legal obligation at is-
sue, they cannot be balanced in the abstract. Since the interests of 
employers and employees are in fundamental conflict, the relative 
strengths of the interests, the burden on the employer should he be 
obligated as a "successor," the harshness on the employees of a denial 
of the requested relief, and the reasonable expectations of the parties, 
must all be considered if a fair result is to be reached. 
Other factors courts should weigh in applying the footnote 9 test 
to successorship problems are not difficult to perceive. Clearly, the 
policies of the national labor laws are relevant. Among the policies 
that have been identified are the policy favoring arbitration as a 
method of resolving labor disputes, 116 the policy opposing any com-
pulsion as to collective bargaining contract terms, 117 the policy of 
encouraging free transfer of capital, 118 and the general policy of 
maintaining industrial peace and stability.U0 Because these policies 
may at times conflict, they must also be weighed in light of the 
circumstances of each case and the obligation at issue. 
As well as considering national policy, courts should carefully 
examine the facts of each case, particularly as they explain the 
interests and obligations involved. Continuity of the business enter-
prise is a prerequisite to the obligation to arbitrate because, presuma-
bly, employee interests never justify burdening the owner of an 
essentially different business with labor obligations that he did not 
assume. But, whether continuity of the business enterprise exists is 
itself a question of fact, determined by examining factors such as the 
continuity of the work force, the similarity of methods of operation 
before and after the transfer, and the extent of the transfer of assets 
from the old to the new employer.120 Each of these factors affects 
116. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,549 (1964). 
117. See NLRB v. Bums Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272,287 (1972). 
118. See NLRB v. Bums Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972). 
119. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973); NLRB 
v. Bums Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972); John Wiley & Sons 
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,549 (1964). 
120. See text at notes 16-22 supra. 
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the balance of the interests mentioned above. For example, it seems 
fairer to require a new employer to assume labor obligations of his 
predecessor when there has been a transfer of most of the assets of the 
former employer's business than when the assets have not been trans-
ferred. Hence, a sale-of-assets case may be treated differently from a 
case in which "successorship" is established through competitive bid-
ding. The facts bearing on continuity in the enterprise are also 
relevant as indicators of the reasonable expectations of the parties. As 
the work force continuity, 'the similarity of methods of operation, and 
the transfer of assets each increase, so too increase the expectations of 
the new employer and the employees that labor obligations will 
survive the transfer. 
Besides the facts in a particular case that bear on "continuity of 
identity of the business enterprise," courts have attached relevance to 
the existence of a second union, the mode of transfer, and the 
availability of alternative forms of relief. 121 The cases that found the 
application of Wiley limited by the presence of a second union122 did 
so in recognition of the fact that the interests of the predecessor's 
employees may be outweighed by the interests of the successor's other 
employees and their union, and the public's interest in industrial 
peace. The mode of transfer of the business bears on the reasonable 
expectations of the parties and, more importantly, affects the availa-
bility of alternative remedies.123 The availability of relief from the 
predecessor naturally affects the balance of employer and employee 
interests: If the employees can recover complete relief from their 
former employer, their case for burdening the successor employer is 
weakened; on the other side, the extent of the burden on the successor 
employer may depend on his ability to obtain either indemnification 
from the predecessor for any obligation the successor must assume or 
an adjustment in the purchase price of the business. Because the 
availability of alternative remedies is not determined by any single 
fact, such as the mode of transfer, courts weighing the impact of this 
factor should examine carefully the facts of each case. 
The particular labor obligation at issue has a significant effect on 
the balancing of factors in a given case. Consequently, as Wiley and 
Burns well illustrate, a successor employer in a given circumstance 
may have some labor obligations imposed on him and not others. In 
Wiley, the successor was found to have a duty to arbitrate the extent 
of its obligations under its predecessor's collective bargaining agree-
ment, but would not have . had to recognize and bargain with the 
121. See text at notes 23, 89 supra. 
122. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text. 
123. See text at note 89 supra. 
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union as its employees' representative.124 In Burns, on the other 
hand, the Court decided that Burns was required to recognize and 
bargain with the incumbent union, but was not required to honor the 
collective bargaining agreement made by the union and the old 
employer. 
Taken together, Burns and Wiley suggest that the balancing 
process should consider whether the union seeks to protect its inter-
ests through arbitration or through an action before the NLRB.12G An 
arbitrator has flexibility in fashioning an award and can consider the 
particular circumstances of the case that may make the imposition of 
contract terms unfair to the new employer.126 The burden of arbitra-
tion on the employer is therefore not as great as it would be were the 
NLRB simply to order the employer to honor his predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining agreement-a factor that should be weighed in bal-
ancing competing interests. As noted above, 127 however, the Court 
in Howard Johnson discredited attempts to distinguish between arbi-
trators and the NLRB because, in the Court's view, the substantive 
result in a particular case should not depend upon the forum in which 
employees seek to assert their rights. Consequently, lower courts 
may be barred from taking this final factor into account. 
The operation of the balancing process is illustrated by Golden 
State, where the Court weighed opposing considerations in determin-
ing whether to require a successor employer to remedy the unfair 
labor practice of his predecessor. In Golden State, the Court found 
warranted the imposition on the successor of a duty to remedy the 
predecessor's wrongful discharge of an employee.128 The lack of an 
alternative remedy for the employee, and the various ways open to the 
employer to minimize his cost of compliance, were factors recognized 
by the Court as particularly relevant to the obligation at issue. The 
relief granted by the Court in Golden State should be noted once 
again: The successor employer was compelled to hire one of his 
predecessor's employees, even though, as the Court observed, 120 he 
was free under Burns not to hire any of the former employees. The 
rule that the Court extracted from Burns and applied in Howard 
Johnson, therefore, is less absolute than the Court implied. It is 
rather like other policies of the labor laws: It must be considered in 
light of the other interests involved, the facts of the case, and the 
obligation at issue. 
124. See 376 U.S. at 551 n.5. 
125. See text at notes 55-51 supra. 
126. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 355 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 
1964). 
127. See text at note 86 supra. 
128. See 414 U.S. at 185, quoted in the text at note 80 supra. 
129. 414 U.S. at 184 n.6, 188 n.10. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The impact of Howard Johnson on successorship law is difficult 
to summarize definitively. Howard Johnson related most directly to 
Wiley and the duty of a successor employer to arbitrate under his 
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, a duty that the Court 
was careful to say was not totally abolished by its holding. Moreo-
ver, in footnote 9, the Court laid the basis for a reconciliation of 
Wiley with the apparently conflicting principles of successorship law 
applied in Burns and in Howard Johnson. Yet the continuing vitality 
of Wiley, which had already been jeopardized by Burns, seems to 
have been further impaired by Howard Johnson, for, rather than 
taking advantage of the mode of analysis it suggested in footnote 9, 
the Court announced a broad rule that continuity of identity of the 
work force 1s a precondition to requiring a successor employer to 
arbitrate under his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. 
Such a rule not only was unnecessary to reach the result in that case, 
but it severely limited Wiley from a practical point of view by 
allowing successor employers to avoid incurring an obligation to 
arbitrate by not hiring a "substantial" number of their predecessors' 
employees.13° Furthermore, the emphasis in Howard Johnson was 
less on the interests of the employees than on those of the new 
employer. It seems accurate to conclude, therefore, that while Wiley 
may have survived Howard Johnson, it has done so with diminished 
vigor. 
130. This means of evading the obligation may be impractical or undesirable for 
some successor employers. When hiring his new work force, the employer must not, 
of course, discriminate against the former employees because of their union member-
ship lest he commit an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 
Moreover, the old work force may well contain most, or even all, of the readily avail-
able workers with the particular skills required in the business, or the employer may 
find it advantageous to keep operations going without the disruption of changing per~ 
sonnel. Nevertheless, the decision is left primarily in the employer's hands, and, in 
many cases, the change in the work force will be effected easily. 
